This paper investigates the effect of fund managers' performance evaluation on their asset allocation decisions. We derive optimal contracts for delegated portfolio management and show that they always contain relative performance elements.
Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of fund managers' performance evaluation on their asset allocation decisions. An increasing proportion of assets are managed by large institutions, in particular pension funds and mutual funds.
1 Hence, a large proportion of shares and other assets traded on public exchanges are managed by fund managers who are employees and therefore subject to continuous appraisal by the market. This is reflected in the compensation they receive from the owners and trustees of the funds they manage.
In many cases this has introduced strong elements of either explicit or implicit relative performance evaluation into their compensation. Explicit relative performance typically takes the form of benchmarking of returns on the portfolios under management with the return earned by an index or the median fund in the industry. Implicit relative performance evaluation, on the other hand, comes into play when decisions of contract renewal and reallocation of assets under management take into account the performance of other funds over the same period.
2
This has given rise to a general impression that because the fund managers are evaluated against their peers, they tend to ignore their own information and "go with the flow". In this paper we show that the relative performance element in the fund manager's contract indeed induces them to neglect a part of their own information and adjust their portfolio allocation to that of other funds. In the UK there exists some evidence of remarkable similarity of 1
In 1955 institutions owned 23% of US equities while individuals owned 77%; by 1990 the institutional share has gone up to 53% and the share of the individual investors has fallen to 47%. See Lakonishok et al (1991) . In UK the equity ownership by institutional investors constitutes about 80% according to Quality of Markets Quarterly (1991) of the London Stock Exchange.
2 Lakonishok et. al. (1992) observe that advisors who outperform their peers get more new accounts and assets under management. Huddart (1995) models this competition for assets under management.
asset allocations of actively managed portfolios. 3 For Germany, Oehler (1995) has found evidence of herding for mutual funds.
One may argue that ignoring one's own information and mimicking the trades of others may not be too bad if others have superior information. The important question seems to be whether this happens even when one's information is superior. To capture this notion, we consider a case when the fund manager is better informed than the agent he is benchmarked against. If one draws upon the well-accepted terminology in the herding literature, one can think of this as the case where the fund manager is "smart" while the agent who he is benchmarked against is "dumb". We show that with a relative performance contract, it is optimal for the smart manager to neglect his superior information and herd with the dumb, i.e., mimic the trades of the agent against whom he is benchmarked, even if that agent is less informed.
We also show that benchmarking can induce the smart manager to herd with the dumb and trade in a direction that is completely opposite of that dictated by his superior information, i.e., buy when he would have sold had he been trading on his own account (and vice-versa) . In addition, benchmarking can also encourage the smart manager to trade at times he would not have traded had he been managing his own money. This phenomenon where the smart manager mimics the trades of the dumb is exactly opposite that observed in Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and arises in our model due to the relative performance element in the fund manager's contract.
Unlike previous authors who studied this subject, this paper analyses the economics of asset allocation decisions in the context of a model where the optimal contracts of fund managers are derived explicitly in a principal-agent framework. We analyse two types of con-3 See e. g. the publication by the WM company (1995) on some of the interquartile ranges of UK pension tracts: (1) moral hazard contracts, where compensation contracts induce the fund manager to make non-observable investments in order to acquire superior information, and (2) screening contracts, where the compensation offered to the fund manager ensures that applicants are of sufficient quality. Under these circumstances, the fund manager is subjected to risk. Since other traders or fund managers in the market are subject to very similar exogenous influences, and perform very similar tasks, the principal can reduce the agent's exposure to risk by making his the fund manager's compensation contingent on his performance relative to his peers.
As a consequence, asset allocation decisions of fund managers depend not only on the expected returns and risks of their own portfolio, but also on their (perceived) correlation with those portfolios they are compared with.
Next, we take the relative performance contract as given and examine the fund manager's trading behavior in two different cases. In the first case, we endow the fund manager with superior information and show that at times he ignores his superior information and mimics the trades of the less informed (this is the case discussed above). In the second case, we make the choice of information acquisition endogenous and demonstrate several results. In particular, we show that the fund managers may decide to acquire the same information and the same assets as their peers, even if these decisions do not maximise risk adjusted expected returns (herding). Trustees who write these contracts rationally anticipate this behaviour. Under some circumstances they prefer the wage reduction possible with a relative performance contract to the higher returns available if fund managers do not herd.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the general structure of the model. Section 4 studies two differfunds and "Fund managers seen to follow herd", Financial Times, March 13, 1995, p. 8.
ent reasons for giving fund managers relative performance contracts and derives the optimal contracts. Section 5 takes the optimal contract as given and examines the asset allocation decisions when information endowment is exogenous. Section 6 endogenizes the information acquisition decision and examines the circumstances under which the fund managers decide to acquire the same information as their peers. Section 7 concludes offering suggestions for further research. All proofs are gathered in the appendix.
Discussion of the literature
Our work has some similarity with the work of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) . In
Froot et. al. investors with a short horizon seek information held by other traders. They ignore information about the fundamental value of the asset and herd on a subset of information. In their work, this happens due to the fact that fundamental information (which has a long term horizon) may not be incorporated into prices before the end of their investment horizon.
Whereas they assume exogenously given investment horizons, we derive the optimal contract which gives rise to this suboptimal behavior endogenously. This suboptimal behavior in our model is in the spirit of Dow and Gorton (1994) who improve on the literature on noise trading 4 by explaining apparent noise trading from rational behavior.
Our work differs from the previous theoretical work and argues that herding arises due to the relative performance nature of the compensation contract offered to the fund managers.
It shows that the apparently suboptimal herding behavior by fund managers arises from a fully rational response to their compensation contracts. 5 Our work is consistent with the observation made by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) in their empirical investigation of US 4
See, e.g. Black (1986) , Trueman (1988 ), de Long et. al. (1989 . Also, see Paul (1995) .
Pension fund data that "Managers are evaluated against each other. To avoid falling behind a peer group by following a unique investment strategy, they have an incentive to hold the same stocks as other money managers."
This type of relative performance evaluation is also used by Zwiebel (1995) and Huddart (1995) in models with reputation. In these models, in the first period investors learn about the ability of the managers (by comparing their performance with that of others). Having learnt about the ability of the managers in the first period, the investors update their beliefs and take appropriate action in the second period which introduces relative performance evaluation implicitly. In our model, we specify a contract with relative performance evaluation explicitly to capture similar economics in a single period model and obtain stronger results about the behavioral implications.
Other papers in the theoretical literature have analysed herding in the context of managerial reputation, payoff externalities and informational cascades. 6 Herding and other anomalies of investor decisions are also discussed from a behavioral sciences point of view 7 . The pioneering paper on delegated portfolio management is Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) which examines the case of direct sale of information. Unlike them, however, we focus on indirect sales of information (cf. also Pfleiderer (1986), (1990) ). In our case, the principal designs an optimal contract. Given the contract the fund manager engages in trades 5 See Brennan (1993) for asset pricing implications when a large fraction of investors are awarded a relative performance contract. See, e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Rajan (1994) for herding due to managerial reputation. Examples of herding arising out of payoff externalities are bank runs by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , information acquisition by Brennan (1990) and optimal timing of trades in the presence of informed trading by Admati and Pfliederer (1988) . Herding also arises in the context of informational cascades as shown by Banerjee (1992) , Welch (1992) and Bickchandani et. al. (1992) .
that maximize his utility. We show that the fund manager's trades differ a great deal from what the principal would have traded had the information been sold directly. Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) and Huddart (1995) have looked at the dynamic implications of delegated portfolio management contracts which are beyond the scope of our paper.
The model
The model is a two stage model in which a principal hires an agent (fund manager) to manage her portfolio. In subsequent sections we will describe several variations of the basic model, and this section describes only the general framework common to all of them.
The principal hires an agent who has the ability to acquire information about assets which the principal does not have. After negotiating the initial contract the agent becomes informed about the asset and makes portfolio decisions on behalf of the principal. Generally, we The agent makes a portfolio decision by purchasing a quantity x 1 of the asset subsequent to learnings 1 . The order is placed with a market maker. The order is executed at some price p set by a market maker. Finally, total profits on the portfolio are realised and given by ( )π own account. This trader is indexed 2. Trader 2 purchases a quantity x 2 and realises profits
Since the profits of the agent and trader 2 are correlated, the principal can benefit from this correlation by proposing a relative performance contract to the agent. We assume linearity, so that the generic form of the contract proposed by the principal to the agent is:~w
where w 1 denotes the wage received by trader 1. We assume that both the agent and trader 2 have standard CARA preferences with risk parameter ρ. Then expected utility of the agent conditional on the signal s 1 is given as: =~,π π . The principal's objective is to maximise:
subject to constraints which ensure that the agent accepts the contract proposed and that the agent becomes informed subsequent to accepting the contract.
Optimal contracts
This section derives the general contract, which is independent of the market mechanism of the second stage. The details of the contract depend on the characteristics of the principal-agent problem. We investigate two situations: one where the agent can only become informed if he incurs a non-verifiable cost c (moral hazard, section 4.1), and one where the principal has to screen agents who have the ability to become informed from those who do not (adverse selection, section 4.2).
Optimal Contracts in the presence of Moral Hazard
This section models hiring of the agent (fund manager) as a moral hazard problem.
Subsequent to accepting the contract the agent incurs a non-verifiable cost c for obtaining information. Hence, if he becomes informed and trades, his utility is denoted by U I and given as:
If the agent does not become informed, he does not trade, whereas the second agent (trader 2) continues to trade. Assume the distribution of trader 2's profits is unaffected by the actions of trader 1. Then the utility of agent 1 denoted by U N if he does not incur the costs c to become informed is given by:
Then the principal's problem for choosing the optimal contract is to maximise the objective (3.3) subject to the participation constraint (PC) that the agent accepts the contract trader as someone who is managing the funds of his own company, e.g., an Insurance Company.
proposed, i.e., U I ≥ 0 , and the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) that the agent becomes 
where the ψ is the Lagrange multiplier and the term in large brackets equals U I -U N .
Proposition 1 gives the optimal contract for this case:
Proposition 1 (Moral hazard):
The optimal contract is given by the saddle point of the Lagrangian (4.4) . The parameters are: the expression under the square root sign in (4.5) is negative), then the incentive compatibility constraint would either never be binding or there would be no α for which the constraint were satisfied. Clearly, the constraint is binding, otherwise α=0 could be a solution, and this is not the case.
Optimal Contracts as Screening Devices
This section derives the optimal contract when the principal-agent problem involves screening good agents from bad agents. Specifically, there are two types of agents. A large number of agents who do not have the ability to process information and become informed (bad agents). Their opportunity costs of being employed are given by c N . Then there is a small number of agents who have the ability to become informed (good agents). Their opportunity costs of being employed are c I . We denote the utility of good agents if they accept the contract by U I where:
while we denote the utility of bad agents if they accept the contract by:
Then the principal's problem for choosing the optimal contract (α,β) is to maximise net profits subject to the participation constraint (PC) for the good agents and the screening constraint (SC) whereby the bad agents do not accept the contract. Thus, the principal's programme in this case can be written as:
. .
1-(PC) (SC)
The same argument as before leads to the conclusion that the participation constraint is binding, so that SC becomes U N ≤ 0 and the resulting Lagrangian is given by:
Proposition 2 below provides the solution to the principal's programme.
Proposition 2 (Screening):
The optimal contract is given by the saddlepoint of the Lagrangian (4.9) . If c c The utility of the principal is given as:
for both cases.
The screening contract is slightly different from the moral hazard contract, even though they share some similar features. If contracts are used for screening, then the primary goal of the principal is to penalise the agent if he underperforms relative to another agent (benchmark), so that it is not worth his while to accept a contract without having the ability to become informed. This is ensured by the screening constraint (SC). It is easy to see that no benchmarking and risk taking is necessary if the opportunity cost of the potentially informed applicants do not exceed those who cannot become informed. In this case the principal chooses simply φ=c I and any bad agent does not apply for the contract since it does not cover his outside employment option. This is a rather uninteresting and also implausible case.
Otherwise, since the principal can not distinguish between good and bad agents, she has to impose a risk on the good as well as the bad agent. The good agent requires compensation for this risk taking, hence this risk needs to be minimised. This is achieved through the value of α given above, which is now proportional to the slope coefficient of regressing the profits of the agent on those of trader 2. Note also that the principal's utility increases in the R 2 of this regression, since a higher correlation of π 1 and π 2 allows for more precise bench-marking. If profits are perfectly correlated, benchmarking is perfect which gives a higher insurance possibility. If profits are perfectly correlated, insurance possibilities are perfect and
This completes the first stage of the model wherein we derived the principal-agent contract in the presence of moral hazard and screening problem. We showed that the optimal contract always involves a relative performance component. Having derived the optimal contract, we now proceed to the second stage of the model and examine the effect of such a contract on the behavior of agents (fund managers). We examine this in two types of market structures. Firstly, a quote driven dealership market with a single asset, and secondly an auction order driven market with two assets.
Asset Allocation in a Bid-Ask Market with a Single Risky Asset
We consider a pure exchange economy in which there exists a single risky asset and a riskless asset (the numeraire, with zero normalised return), each pays off in units of a single consumption good. 9 There exists a competitive dealership market in which the risky asset can be traded at the posted prices which all market participants take as given.
The economy consists of two (imperfectly) informed risk averse agents and a large number of liquidity traders whose trades are assumed to be independent of prices for simplicity. 10 The first informed agent is the fund manager while the second informed agent (denoted as trader 2) trades on his own account. As discussed earlier, the principal finds it optimal to offer the fund manager a relative performance contract which links his compensation to the 9 This economy is similar to that in George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1994) except that we have competitive market makers and price inelastic liquidity traders. profits of trader 2. As in the previous section, we continue to assume that both informed agents have CARA preferences over consumption of the single good with risk parameter ρ.
To examine whether an optimal relative performance contract induces a fund manager to ignore his superior information and herd with his peers who may be less informed, we consider the case where the fund manager's information set nests that of trader 2. Thus, this is the case where the fund manager is smart, while trader 2, against whom the fund manager is benchmarked, is dumb.
We denote the risky asset payoff by ṽ . Let trader 2 observe a signal s 2 while the fund manager observes not only s 2 but also an additional signal s 1 that is independent of s 2 .
11
After observing s 2 , trader 2 maximises his expected utility by choosing to hold x 2 shares of the risky asset. Since trader 2 is trading on his own account his risky asset demand is given by = x v -p).
As derived in the previous section, we assume that the fund manager's contract takes the form φ απ βπ + −1 2 , where φ, α and β are constants optimally chosen by the principal.
The profits of the fund manager are given by ~(~) π 1 1 = − x v p where x 1 is his risky asset demand. Since in this economy all market participants take the posted bid-ask prices as given 11 The assumption of independence is without loss of generality. One can always orthogonalize correlated signals to obtain the above structure. The fund manager observes the realizations s 1 and s 2 , takes x 2 as given and maximises the expected utility of his compensation by solving the following problem: Hence, for any relative performance contract there is some herding in the sense that the fund manager always puts a disproportionately larger weight on information he has in common with the trader against whom he is benchmarked, and a disproportionately smaller weight on information private to him. The critical parameter here is β, since if β=0, the demand sensitivities γ γ The optimal stock demands derived above implicitly assumed that the risky asset can be bought or sold at the same price p . We now recompute their optimal stock demands with a given ask (bid) price at which the risky asset can be purchased (sold = γ can be greater than the ask price, less than the bid price or can lie within the bid and the ask prices. In the presence of bid-ask spread, the optimum stock demand of trader 2 is given by:
12
We show later that there exists a unique equilibrium bid-ask spread in this economy. Fund Manager sells as if β=0.
Fund Manager does not trade (which is the optimal action if β=0).
Consider, for instance, the first row of greater than the ask price, less than the bid price or in between the bid and the ask price. If the fund manager would be trading on his own account, then he would have bought the stock in the first case, sold the stock in the second and not traded at all in the third case, i.e., the fund manager's stock demand would have looked like equation (5.6). However, due to the relative performance nature of his contract, the fund manager's stock demand turns out to be different.
This can best be seen in figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In figure 1, are of opposite sign, and the fund manager has three choices: to sell (follow his own, superior information), to buy (herd with the trader he is benchmarked against), or not to trade. The fund manager's expected utility under no trade is given by:
while his expected utility when he submits the optimal demand is given by:
By trading in this case, the fund manager expects to make a loss on his portfolio but also to reduce his risk. He herds with trader 2 and buys the stock if the expected utility of trading turns out to be higher than that of no trade. The optimal decision is expressed in the following lemma: 
This is intuitive and tells us that the fund manager will herd with the less informed trader and buy (sell) the risky asset even when
) provided his own information is not too strong. Hence, the optimal demand given by equation (5.4). As a consequence, the fund manager will sell if:~ This completes the discussion of all nine possibilities listed in table I. As can be seen, the fund manager's optimal stock demand turns out to be very different from what the fund manager would have traded had he been trading on his own account. Having characterized the optimal risky asset demands of trader 2 and the fund manager, we now solve for the equilibrium bid-ask spread 2 s in this economy.
Recall that there exist liquidity traders who submit random trades in the risky asset which are independent of ṽ . We assume that the trades of the liquidity traders are insensitive to the bid-ask spread. 13 Let L ask denote the liquidity demand for buying the stock and We further assume that there exists a competitive dealership market with N market makers who know the structure of the economy-the composition of agents in the economy, the nature of their trading rules and the parameters of distributions describing uncertainty. We assume that each market maker obtains an equal share of liquidity trading and has an equal chance of getting the informed trades. We also assume that potential competition for market making drives the bid and ask prices to a level which offers zero expected profits to the market maker in equilibrium.
Recall that s denotes one half of bid-ask spread and let p be the mid-point of posted bid-ask prices. Then, for each share of the risky asset bought or sold, the market maker earns one half of the spread. If the asset is underpriced relative to its true payoff, the market maker 13 George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1994) solve for an equilibrium in a similar economy when the spread is set by profit maximizing specialist and the liquidity traders submit random but spread sensitive trades. Unlike our economy, there may not exist an equilibrium in theirs. However, whenever there does exist an equilibrium, our results hold in their economy as well.
makes money if market participants sell the asset and loses money if they buy the asset. Let x 1 and x 2 be the risky asset demands of the fund manager and trader 2 (worked out above) as a function of the bid and the ask prices. Then, the profit of each market maker is given by:~~~| |~|) (~~~~π
When the spread equals zero, each market maker makes a loss. As the spread starts to increase, the losses from trading with the informed agents start to reduce while the profits from the liquidity trades start to increase. When the spread becomes very large, each market maker expects to earn a positive profit. Thus, E( ) π is monotone increasing in the bid-ask spread and there exists a unique equilibrium spread s in which provides each market maker earns zero expected profit. Thus, we have just shown:
Lemma 3: There always exists a unique equilibrium bid-ask spread 2 s , so that each market maker earns zero expected profits.
This completes the description of the equilibrium in the economy under consideration.
In this economy, unconditionally the profits of trader 2 and the fund manager are positively correlated due to the common element of the signal. A positive correlation between the profits implies that ex-ante it is optimal for the principal to offer a relative performance contract of the form φ απ βπ + −1 2 where the contract parameters are chosen as shown in the previous section. Hence, summarizing the discussion we have: Hence, in this section we have shown that the optimal contract chosen by the principal induces some degree of herding. This can take either the form of more aggressive trading if the fund manager shares the view of the trader he is benchmarked against, or of trading in the same direction as his benchmark. The relative performance contract sometimes induces the fund manager to trade in a direction that is completely opposite of what he would have done had he been trading on his own account, simply in order to "go with the flow". Sometimes, it also induces the fund manager to trade when he would not have traded had he been managing his own money. Even though there is a positive probability of these events happening, it is optimal for the principal to offer a relative performance contract ex ante in order to save on the costs of screening or providing incentives to the agent. However, ex-post it leads to inefficient outcomes with positive probability. 14 This leads to a situation where the trustees of the fund offer the fund manager a contract in order to induce him to become informed. However, they offer this contract on terms which induce the fund manager to partly ignore the information he has thus acquired.
Until now we focused on the case where the information structure was specified exogenously. In the next section, we examine a case where the fund manager choses to acquire information endogenously.
14 If both informed agents have identical information, then the fund manager does not get subjected to any risk and wishes to trade an arbitrarily large quantity. In such a case, there does not exist an equilibrium in this economy. If trader 2's information set nests that of the fund manager, then the fund manager considers his conditional expectation to be that of the other trader as well and submits optimal trades given his information.. Assume that the distribution of noise traders is given by:
Asset Selection in an Auction
Now, conjecture an equilibrium in which the fund manager trades in asset A. Also, assume that market making is a competitive industry so that market makers make expected profits of zero in equilibrium in each asset. Then the expected gains the market makers make from trading with noise traders must equal the expected losses from trading with informed traders. The gains from trading with noise traders are in expectation λ σ The intuition for this result is easy to see. If both assets have the same distribution, then the expected profits from trading in either one of them are the same. However, if profits are the same, then the only difference in learning about the asset from the point of view of the agent is the risk term, especially since the variance of profits are the same for both marketsthe covariance terms (cf. equation (6.6)). This is another way of expressing the fact that if the fund manager trades in the same market as the trader 2 then he increases his insurance and reduces his risk. Then, any relative performance contract makes him sensitive to this risk and gives him an incentive to trade in the same asset as the trader he is benchmarked against.
Since expected profits are the same, he decides on the basis of this insurance possibility alone.
This leaves the principal, the trustees of fund, with the following choice.
Option 1: He can accept that both traders trade in the same market. This is then rationally anticipated by the market maker, and now the market maker increases λ B to λ B ' in order to take account of the presence of two informed traders instead of one. The condition is now:
Hence, λ B has increased by a factor of 2 . From (6.4) and (6.6) this implies that profits are reduced by this factor.
Option 2: Alternatively, the principal can forego the insurance from the relative performance contract and set β equal to zero. This would give expected profits to the principal as:
( )
Comparing the two options (equations (6.7) and (6.8)) shows then: 
where α is given from:
The result shows that the principal's problem focuses mainly on the degree of risk aversion, i. e. the risk premium she has to pay to the fund manager. The trade-off is essentially between a larger profit in an alternative market A, where the agent does not face any competition, but the lower correlation of returns implies that the agent receives less insurance (option 1), or the principal foregoes the larger expected profit and the agent receives full insurance by trading in the same market (option 2).
The previous discussion has only analysed the simple case where the distribution of profits in the two markets is identical. This section returns to the more general case where they are different. More specifically, assume that σ σ A B 2 2 > . In order to show that herding can occur, it is sufficient to derive an upper bound of the profits the principal can obtain by inducing the agent to trade in asset A, and then to show for which parameters the profits from trading in asset B exceed this upper bound.
The profits from trading in asset A to the principal are: The result shows that the intuition behind proposition 6 generalises to the case where profits in market A are higher than profits in market B. Note that the bound for ρ is increasing in the R 2 of the regression: the higher the R 2 , the better the principal can insure the agent for the risk of trading in another market, thereby reducing the costs for the principal.
Concluding Remarks
The paper has studied a model which links asset allocation decisions taken by professional fund managers to their compensation schemes. Optimal compensation schemes were derived for two cases: (1) fund managers have to be provided with incentives to incur private costs of information acquisition (moral hazard), and (2) trustees have to ensure that only sufficiently competent managers apply for a position of a fund manager (screening). Both scenarios lead to relative performance contracts. In a second step the implications of these contracts for portfolio decisions were derived in the context of different market structures. The first set up analysed the case where one risky asset was traded in a bid-ask market and the agents had imperfect but nested information sets. The main results were:
• Fund mangers adjust their portfolio allocation to that of other funds, even if this implies that they neglect their own superior information.
• Neglecting their superior information may even take the form of buying where they would have sold (and vice versa) if they were trading on their own account.
• Sometimes the fund managers herd and trade when they would not have traded had they been managing their own money.
The second set-up of market structure analysed the choice between two different assets if the fund manager can acquire perfect information about one of these assets, and all fund managers have access to the same information. It was shown that:
• Fund managers decide to acquire the same information and the same asset as their peers, even if the expected returns from these decisions are smaller.
• Trustees who write these contracts rationally anticipate this behaviour. Under some circumstances they prefer the insurance possibilities of a relative performance contract to the higher returns available if fund managers do not herd.
These results could be extended in many ways. For instance, the derivation of optimal contracts was limited to the case where compensation schemes were restricted to be linear.
This is an important limitation since optimal delegated portfolio management contracts could be non-linear. 15 However, since a relative performance element would also be part of a more general contract, we believe that an analysis based on more general contractual forms would not lead to different qualitative implications for asset allocations.
We have also restricted attention to the case of one fund manager whose compensation is set through a principal-agent set-up, treating the second fund mangers' compensation as exogenous by assuming that he is trading on his own account. A more general model could look at the implications of relative performance contracts for all funds, effectively benchmarking funds against each other. Richer informational settings, e.g., allowing for non-nested information sets may yield further interesting insights. We leave these questions for future research.
15
See, e.g., Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) and Stoughton (1993) for non-linear contracts. The smaller root is chosen and given in the text.
Proof of proposition 3:
Note from equation (5.4) that δ γ αρ 
